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The historiography on the Great Depression of the 1930s has lan-
guished in the last two decades, at least in Germany. There are several 
reasons for this. First of all, the debate on Heinrich Brüning’s auster-
ity policy and its possible alternatives, which fl ared up in the context 
of the debates on the crisis of Keynesianism in the late 1970s and 
1980s, has for the most part been exhausted.2 Second, in Germany a 
landscape of commissioned company studies has blossomed. Even 
though the Great Depression usually represents an important episode 
in the history of the fi rms being studied, this history usually pales 
in comparison with the period of Nazi regime, given the evidence of 
a company’s entanglement with National Socialism.3 Third, unlike 
economic historians and economists who have used the depression 
as an exercise in refl ecting on economic theories — much more so 
in the United States than in Europe4 — cultural historians have not 
seen this period as a stimulating challenge, quite unlike the preceding 
turbulent periods of the revolution, infl ation, and the “golden years” 
of the Weimar Republic. A fourth reason for this relative neglect is 
that the Great Depression no longer holds a place of its own in what 
has become the common historical periodization. On the one side, 
two decades divide the Great Depression from what is by now referred 
to — somewhat exaltingly — as the “golden age” of “social demo-
cratic consensus” (Eric Hobsbawn/Tony Judt) or the postwar period 
of “consensus liberalism” (Anselm Doering-Manteuff el), which plays 
such an important role, at least in German debates. On the other side, 
two decades separate the Great Depression from the end of the “long 
nineteenth century” and the heyday of what Detlev Peukert has called 
“classical modernity.” Although Peukert and other historians placed 
great emphasis on the transformative years of the early 1930s, this 
rather short period has become somewhat of a side story.5 The reason 
for this is quite clear: Grave as the political and economic crisis of 
the 1930s was, its impact can only be understood in the context of a 
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longue durée not only of mentalities and ideologies but also of social 
and political practices that precede the Great Depression. 
We will see whether the more recent worldwide fi nancial crisis will 
bring new impulses to historiography.6 What has become quite 
evident so far is a fl ourishing interest in the history of “capitalism” — 
which has always been, to a considerable extent, the history of its 
crises. Yet the question of which analogies or comparisons should 
and can be made remains controversial. Two years ago, in his 
Feldman Lecture, Jürgen Kocka emphasized the diff erences between 
the current fi nancial crisis and that of the 1930s. He referred to the 
fundamentally dissimilar political constellations, but he also meant 
the roles of fi nance capitalism then and now. “This fi nance-market-
related part of capitalism [today -MHG] is much larger, more apart 
from the rest, more global, more dynamic, and more powerful than 
in the 1920s and 1930s, and it is less regulated than it was twenty 
years ago.”7 This may be true, but contemporaries eighty years ago 
had good reason to see their crisis as the worst so far; and “fi nance 
capitalism” was as much a sore issue then as it had been during the 
economic crisis of the 1870s or is today.
However, recent events have greatly increased the interest in Manias, 
Panics and Crashes (Kindleberger) and also in the shadier sides of 
capitalism, including corruption.8 Unlike some textbook versions, 
capitalism is not characterized by a state of equilibrium. Cycles of 
expansive and “speculative” waves involve people who at times act 
with what Keynes called “animal spirits.” More oft en than not, bank-
ers, entrepreneurs, and fi nanciers operate close to the edge of what 
is legal and moral, themes that have traditionally inspired many nov-
elists.9 Economic risk-taking is a form of speculation on the future 
under precarious conditions. Yesterday’s heroes are today’s failures, 
and the line that separates the serious businessmen from what I call 
Grenzgänger of capitalism is sometimes thin indeed. Grenzgänger are 
those involved in extremely risky businesses, and there are many types 
of these blatant “rule benders,” including crooks and swindlers. In 
times of crisis, they tend to be the fi rst to run into trouble and therefore 
inadvertently attract attention to themselves, usually to everybody’s 
surprise. Despite the moral outrage which they provoke, they are part 
of any economic system. This might be disturbing and distressing; 
of critical importance is the moment when the impression becomes 
prevalent in the public at large that the economic system is dominated 
by such Grenzgänger. “If the big banks can’t be relied on any more, it’s 
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best to trust one’s money 
to the casino”, spoofed 
one caricature in the Ger-
man satirical weekly Sim-
plicissimus in the wake of 
the 1931 banking crisis 
while depicting bour-
geois banker-like types 
at the roulette tables (see 
fi gure 1).
The polemical  talk 
about “casino capital-
ism” predates the crash 
of 1929. It signifies a 
crisis of legitimacy af-
fecting not only sup-
posedly r isk-averse 
institutions such as 
banks, but even more 
so the people who run 
them.10 From here it is 
ideologically not a big 
leap to attack bankers 
as a group of white-
collar gangsters; in 
fact, it appears that 
the leader of the Bel-
gian radical right, Leon 
Degrelle, can claim to 
have invented the neologism “bankster” in the 1930s.11 
Political scandals and criminal investigations fueled the fi res that 
discredited business and businessmen during the Great Depression. 
Germany hotly debated the briberies of the Berlin magistrate by 
the Jewish Sklarek brothers and various forms of fraud and failings 
aff ecting many big companies. One was the case of the Schultheiss-
Patzenkofer brewery, in which top-level directors at the Deutsche 
Bank were involved. In 1933, the U.S. Senate held public hearings into 
fraudulent business practices of bankers and investigated, among 
other issues, whether bankers made loans to public offi  cials. In 1934, 
France experienced the notorious right-wing Stavisky riots, which 
were directed against the personal connections of French politicians 
10  Urs Stäheli, Spectacular 
Speculation: Thrill, the Eco-
nomy, and the Popular Dis-
course (Stanford, CA, 2013).
11  Léon Degrelle, Les voleurs 
de al banque nationale 
(Bruxelles, 1937), 16ff ., 
21, 48, 101.
Figure 1. “If the big banks 
can’t be relied on any 
more, it’s best to trust 
one’s money to the 
casino.” Simplicissimus 
36 (1931), no. 18 (3 August 
1931), p. 208. Reprinted 
with permission.
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to the Ukrainian-born swindler Alexandre Stavisky. In the mid-1930s 
Belgium witnessed an odd replay of a political drama that had shaken 
Germany in 1925 involving a certain Julius Barmat, a Ukrainian-born 
stateless Jew and a resident of the Netherlands, a Grenzgänger of 
capitalism whom polemical writers stylized as the epitome of the 
corruption plaguing democratic and liberal political systems.12 
Blaming Jews was a common practice and spread like wildfi re in the 
1930s, at a time when the radical right was on the rise, not only in 
Germany. However, this anti-Semitism should not obscure the fact 
that the problems ran deeper. For every political scandal there were 
legions of similar cases about dubious business practices, wrongdo-
ings, and speculative moves on the stock market involving countless 
private “investors,” among them even some famous economists such 
as John Maynard Keynes in England and Irving Fisher in the United 
States (and a great many others who preferred to remain silent for 
obvious reasons). People discussed the “future of capitalism,” and 
this involved not only institutions but also real people. Moreover, 
the phenomenon of speculation raised the question of the moral 
order of society, specifi cally, the failings of individuals and institu-
tions, paths wrongly taken, and the contested relationship between 
state and economy, which needed to be mended by new forms of 
Ordnungspolitik.13
My investigation will begin by pinpointing the saliency and urgency 
of the amorphous and ambiguous phenomenon known as “specula-
tion,” which at the time was discussed in widely diff ering contexts 
ranging from the economic prosperity induced mostly by foreign 
credits to the crisis of capitalism — in other words, in terms of boom 
and bust. I am particularly interested in how the debates over the 
causes of bust prompted notions of an economic emergency (Aus-
nahmezustand) and how they infl uenced policy-making.14 My narrative 
of the Great Depression diff ers from those focusing on the issue of 
unemployment or on the “sick economy” (Knut Borchardt) caused by 
high wages and the welfare state. What were the German peculiari-
ties in these debates about speculation? For the sake of illustration, 
I will draw on the case of a man by the name of Jakob Michael, a 
well-known, albeit now mostly forgotten German fi nancier at the 
time. For many contemporaries Michael embodied not only specula-
tive capitalism but also the “spectacular speculations” (Urs Stäheli) 
of the post-World War I period. Thus this essay asks how popular 
resentment against speculation and speculators became entangled 
12  Cordula Ludwig, Korruption 
und Nationalsozialismus in 
Berlin 1924-1934 (Frankfurt, 
1998), 167-184; Cordula 
Ludwig, Soziale Utopien und 
religiös-kulturelle Traditionen 
(Tübingen, 1992), 193-213; 
Martin Fiedler, “Netzwerke 
des Vertrauens: Zwei Fall-
beispiele aus der deutschen 
Wirtschaft selite,” in Großbürger 
und Unternehmer: Die deutsche 
Wirtschaft selite im 20. 
Jahrhundert, ed. Dieter Ziegler 
(Göttingen, 2000), 93-115. 
Paul Jankowski, Stavisky: A 
Confi dence Man in the Repub-
lic of Virtues (Ithaca, 2002); 
Vincent P. Carosso, Investment 
Banking in America (Cam-
bridge, MA, 1970), 326-351; 
Martin Geyer “Der Barmat-
Kutisker-Skandal und die 
Gleichzeitigkeit des Unglei-
chzeitigen‘ in der politischen 
Kultur der Weimarer Repub-
lik,” in Politische Kultur und 
Medienwirklichkeiten in den 
1920er Jahren, ed. Ute Daniel 
et al. (Munich, 2010), 47-80.
13  Werner Abelshauser, 
“Die ordnungspolitische 
Epochenbedeutung der 
Weltwirtschaft skrise in 
Deutschland: Ein Beitrag zur 
Entstehungsgeschichte der 
Sozialen Marktwirtschaft ,” in 
Ordnungspolitische Weichen-
stellungen nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg, ed. Dietmar Petzina 
(Berlin, 1991), 11-29.
14  In this essay, I expand on 
some thoughts fi rst developed 
in Martin H. Geyer, “Grenz-
überschreitungen: Vom 
Belagerungszustand zum 
Ausnahmezustand,” in Erster 
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with the economic emergency thinking of the early 1930s and state-
organized anti-Semitism.
II. 
Economic speculation is probably best defi ned as the practice of deal-
ing in fl uctuating values — in other words, fi nancial transactions that 
imply a bet on the future with respect to market fl uctuations not just 
of stocks, bonds, and currencies but also of all tradable goods from 
gold to houses. More oft en than not, such a defi nition implies that 
these activities are particularly risky, yet this is notoriously murky 
(if not tautological), considering how historically constructed the 
idea of risk is. Thus, it is a matter of — endless — debate as to what 
separates economically “functional” and “benefi cial” speculation, 
on the one hand, from “dysfunctional” and disruptive speculation, 
on the other. The line is thin indeed and leaves much room for inter-
pretation, with a heavy preponderance (not just among professional 
historians) of backward-looking prophets. This has much to do with 
the fact that in everyday language, the term “speculation” is mostly 
used in a pejorative way dominated by the assumption of socially and 
morally defi cient behavior on the part of individuals: Aft er all, dealing 
with “fl uctuating values” implies the possibility that “all that is solid 
melts into air,” to quote the book title of Marshall Berman in which 
he deals with the “experience of modernity.” 
When the proverbial “bubble” bursts — in other words, when 
expectations with respect to the future turn out to be wrong — the 
phenomenon of speculation becomes most apparent. The stock 
market crash of October 1929 and its long aft ermath illustrate this 
well.15 The crash marked the end of the speculative boom years and 
what some German contemporaries disparagingly called — mostly 
ex post facto — the Prosperitätstaumel or Scheinblüte that had been 
made possible by the infl ow of American credit in the mid-1920s. 
During this period the buoyant economic optimism and the new 
opportunities for speculative activity, even for small investors, had 
been contagious. More than anywhere else, the United States was 
the country of “Speculation,” writ large literally and fi guratively, 
as one contemporary British author, R. H. Mottram, dared to do 
in a book on the subject matter.16 Next to the boom in real estate, 
there were new — and supposedly secure — innovative fi nancial 
products and practices, like buying on margin, which became avail-
able to larger sectors of the population. Fortunes could be made on 
15  Liquat Ahamed, Lords of 
Finance: The Brokers who 
Broke the World (New 
York, 2009).
16  R[alph] H[ale] Mottram, A 
History of Financial Specu-
lation (London, 1929).
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booming stock markets all over the world, featuring the stocks and 
bonds of highly dynamic and oft en international companies like 
the Ford Motor Company or that of the Swede Ivar Kreuger, who 
was active in North America and Europe and was certainly one of 
the most charismatic businessmen of his time.17 In some countries 
like Belgium, savings banks and cooperative banks ventured into 
hitherto unknown territory by transforming their business strate-
gies, adding investment branches, and luring their savers with high 
returns. Everywhere businessmen could be found who promised 
castles in the air: an airport or housing project here and a new 
banking scheme there wetted the appetite of those who were afraid 
to miss lucrative opportunities.18 
This spirit of speculation invaded people’s private lives and became 
common parlance in places where one would not expect it. It was 
a well-known fact already at the time that many bank employees 
participated actively in the stock market. But who would expect the 
honorable mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, to almost “gamble 
away” a great portion of his family’s wealth? Like many men of 
similar bourgeois stature, Adenauer, with his many contacts to 
bankers and industrialists, was aff ected by the exuberance of the 
American stock market boom and, enticed by the possible profi ts, 
switched from conservative to more risky investments in American 
stocks — stocks that kept heading in only one direction even be-
fore but especially aft er the crash of 1929, namely down the drain. 
Burdened with a debt of at least 1.4 million Marks, also as a result 
of previous bank loans, Adenauer ended up being bailed out by the 
Deutsche Bank by way of a complicated transaction, which raised 
what we would call today serious ethical questions. Contemporaries 
from the right talked about corruption, for two reasons: Adenauer 
was a member of the supervisory board of Deutsche Bank, and 
Cologne was deeply indebted and in dire need of credit even be-
fore the depression.19 Incidentally, Adenauer invested in the stock 
of German Glanzstoff , a German branch of an American company 
that (over)invested in facilities to produce rayon, that is, artifi cial 
silk, the material of which the dreams of Irmgards Keun’s novel 
Kunstseidene Mädchen (1932) were made. Unlike the protagonist of 
this very popular (and much underestimated) novel of the Weimar 
Republic who came to Berlin with grand illusions, Adenauer blamed 
almost everybody, including bankers and the boastful general di-
rector of German Glanzstoff e, except himself for the diffi  culties he 
had gotten into. 
17  Frank Partnoy, The Matsch 
King: Ivar Kreuger and the 
Financial Sacandal of the Cen-
tury (London, 1996).
18  Leen van Molle, Chacun pour 
tous : Le Boerenbond Belge 
1890-1990 (Louvain, 1990).
19  For diff erent interpretations 
of this interesting case, see 
Hans-Peter Schwarz, 
Adenauer. Der Aufstieg: 1876-
1952 (Stuttgart, 1986), 
317-340; Henning Köhler, 
Adenauer: Eine politische 
Biographie (Frankfurt, 1994), 
251-264.
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It is easily forgotten that the depression also off ered opportunities 
for speculation. For many Americans (and no doubt their speculat-
ing brethren in Europe), the question was when to get back “into the 
market” and how to raise the money to do so.20 But the opportunities 
were particularly there for “big money.” The economic diffi  culties of 
individual countries and even more so the disintegration of the inter-
national Gold Standard led to a wave of speculative moves primarily 
by institutional investors, who could reap very high profi ts indeed. 
Attacks on currencies by international capitaux migratoires or “hot 
money” caused a great deal of public concern and prompted much 
talk about possible drastic legal action. Well-known are the words 
used by of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his fi rst inaugural 
speech of March 1933 in which he criticized the “moneychangers” 
who had mislead the American people and needed to be driven out 
of the temple.21 This was amid an acute banking crisis in the United 
States that featured strong speculative attacks against the dollar. For 
Roosevelt and many other politicians in similar situations during the 
1930s, this crisis posed an acute state of emergency that called for 
unprecedented measures by the executive. 
III. 
Almost everywhere banks were hit hardest by the crisis. When na-
tional income fell within a very few years by a fi ft h, a third, or — as 
happened in Germany — by about 40 percent, each of the countless 
bank failures and company bankruptcies could be considered as ex-
amples of bad speculation. Due to the drastic fall of the price of stocks 
and bonds every form of credit turned out to be problematic; such 
securities were an important part of the collateral for the loans that 
had been issued. Thus Bankers became the Prügelknaben (scapegoats) 
for nearly everything that had gone wrong.22 Contemporary observ-
ers registered the fall from economic stardom of businessmen and 
particularly bankers, who lost trust and credibility.
This process was also nurtured by the discovery that there were more 
than just a few black sheep operating in the economy, something that 
should not astonished us.23 Thus the crash ruined the reputations 
of seemingly upright men like Paul Dumcke, the director general of 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Versicherungs AG (Favag), an insurance 
corporation whose fi nancial failure in 1929 heralded the bankruptcy 
wave in Germany, or that of the Lahusen family, owners of the Nord-
deutsche Wollkämmerei- und Kammgarnspinnerei AG, the so-called 
20  Benjamin Roth, The Great 
Depression: A Diary, ed. 
James Ledbetter and 
Daniel B. Roth (New York, 
2009).
21  Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
Great Speeches, ed. John 
Craft on (Mineola, N.Y., 
1999), 28-22, 30.
22  Erich W. Abraham, Kon-
zernkrach: Hintergründe, 
Entwicklung und Folgen 
der deutschen Konzernkri-
sen (Berlin, 1933), 144, 
148, 153.
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Nordwolle, who ranked among the best names in Germany, associ-
ated closely for generations with high church positions, the Imperial 
Court of Justice, and the world of business.24 The Favag bankruptcy 
caused fi nancial diffi  culties for many other companies and helped 
trigger the fi rst wave of foreign loan terminations. The failure of the 
Nordwolle, in conjuncture with similar events in Austria involving the 
Austrian Credit-Anstalt, not only brought about serious problems for 
the largest and most dynamically growing bank, the so-called Danat-
Bank under its owner Jakob Goldschmidt, but also caused the near 
collapse of all German fi nance in the summer of 1931.25 Suspicions of 
grave irregularities and fraud turned out to be well founded, not just 
in the cases of Favag and Nordwolle; the banking crisis of the summer 
of 1931 revealed many dubious business deals and practices, which 
prompted public prosecutors to conduct drawn out investigations, 
some of which actually ended up in court. 
One of the most spectacular trials involved the general director of 
the large Berlin Schultheiss-Patzenkofer brewing company, Ludwig 
Katzenellenbogen, a successful venture capitalist married to the 
glamourous actress Tilla Durieux; his business deals with Deutsche 
Bank, among others, turned out to be a great embarrassment for the 
bank. Like the banker Goldschmidt, Katzenellenbogen had shared 
the optimism that the crisis of the economy was only a fl eeting phe-
nomenon that would soon come to an end and that the “psychosis of 
pessimism” (Pessimismus-Psychose) had to be disspelled.26 
All these cases revealed a series of grave misdeeds, some of which 
went well back into the 1920s. The most prominent of these were, 
fi rst, the use of false or manipulated opening Goldmark balances 
following the infl ation; second, the intermingling of personal and 
economic interests — meaning business corruption — particularly 
in awarding loans (as had happened in the Schultheiss-Patzenkofer 
case); third, a lack of business supervision, particularly within banks, 
which raised the question of cognizance; fourth, more or less blatant 
ways of manipulating balance sheets, in which companies registered 
in the nearby tax paradises of the Netherlands and Belgium appeared 
with some regularity (as in the case of Nordwolle, which had manipu-
lated its balance sheets by way of its branch in the Netherlands); fi ft h, 
the manipulation of the stock-market by banks through the practice 
of buying their own stocks; and not to be forgotten, sixth, the more 
or less sensational forms of risky speculation on the stock market 
with the help of and by bank offi  cials themselves by way of credits 
24  Gerald D. Feldman, Allianz 
and the Insurance Business: 
1933-1945 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 2001), 40-43. Dietmar 
von Reeken, Lahusen: Eine 
Bremer Unternehmerdynastie 
1816-1933 (Bremen, 1996), 
96-100.
25  Gerald D. Feldman, “Jakob 
Goldschmidt, the History of 
the Banking Crisis of 1931, 
and the Problem of Freedom 
of Manoeuvre in the Weimar 
Economy,” in Zerissene Zwi-
schenkriegszeit: Wirtschaft s-
historische Beiträge. Knut 
Borchardt zum 65. Geburts-
tag, ed. Christoph Buchheim, 
et al. (Baden-Baden, 1994), 
307-327.
26  Fiedler, Netzwerke, 102.
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they had received from their own banks. By 1931/32, it was quite clear 
that these charges did not just pertain to big banks and industries 
in the industrial centers but that the agricultural credit institutions, 
particularly in Prussia, were also seriously involved. In fact, the latter 
demonstrated some of the worst forms of mismanagement, personal 
failure, and even serious corruption. This had to do also with the 
co-operative, that is, the semi-public form in which many of these 
regional agrarian credit institutions were organized.
Promises of prosperity had been closely linked to the “new heroes” 
in business, the heralds of a new age. It was foreseeable that trouble 
would fi rst arrive at the doorstep of those companies and corpora-
tions that were considered to be extremely dynamic and expansive — 
which was another way of saying that they operated on a very ”specu-
lative” basis; in fact, many had laid the foundation of their fortune 
during the infl ation. In addition to many names long-forgotten, this 
group included men like Friedrich Flick, Otto Wolff , Ludwig Katzenel-
lenbogen, and Jakob Goldschmidt (to name just a few).27 
The Frankfurt businessman Jakob Michael belonged to this group of 
new self-made men. He was one of the boldest and most important 
fi nanciers and entrepreneurs of the Weimar Republic (although he is 
nearly unknown in the literature, even in Jewish history). Like many 
other entrepreneurs in the war economy, he built a corporation dur-
ing the First World War when he started to mine the scarce metal 
Wolfram from previously excavated material, an enterprise which 
expanded in many directions during the infl ation years. Moreover, 
in 1924/25, he bet correctly and cleverly on the stabilization of the 
currency, quite unlike many others, including Hugo Stinnes, who 
went bust. Instead of being stuck with tangibles that had been so 
precious during the infl ation, Michael liquidated a great deal of his 
assets at the very end of the infl ation. This extremely risky strategy 
allowed him to make use of the extreme shortage of capital aft er the 
currency was stabilized — leading to charges of Wucher (usury) — and 
to redirect his business by acquiring, amongst other assets, share 
holdings in big German insurance companies that were in dire straits. 
At the time, his was a well-known story: Michael was thought of as 
the archetype of the “Großspekulant” (Heinrich Brüning), the big-time 
speculator, who had profi teered from war, infl ation, and stabiliza-
tion.28 In the mid-1920s, Jakob Michael ranked among the richest 
people in Germany, and in 1925 he even made it into Time Magazine, 
which heralded him as “Stinnes the Second.” Yet unlike the sturdy 
27  Felix Pinner, Deutsche 
Wirtschaft sführer 
(Charlottenburg, 1925).
28  Der Generalstaatsanwalt 
beim Landgericht I, 
Erster Bericht in Sachen 
Michael & Co, 12.3.1925, 
Geheimes Staatsarchiv 
Preußischer Kulturbesitz, 
Berlin, I HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 
56587; Heinrich Brüning, 
Memoiren, 1918-1934 
(Stuttgart, 1970), 85.
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old man Stinnes, Michael was a “suave, handsome, craft y” Jew and an 
American type of self-made man who seemed to fi t the new times.29 
He built an extremely complex corporation — it was estimated that 
by the 1930 he and his wife Erna controlled 116 interlocked companies 
under various organizational umbrellas — that operated not only in 
Europe but also in North and South America. The new cornerstone 
of his empire consisted of department stores that introduced new 
forms of American-type consumer loans, real estate, and strategically 
selected shareholdings in big German companies. The latter earned 
him a lot of enemies in the banking and insurance industries where 
he was known for the ruthless pursuit of his own fi nancial interests 
by using the leverage provided by his shares.30 To make a long story 
short: Aft er some ingenious moves that got him through the year 
1929 — such as selling his Favag and Induna Insurance shares (the 
latter to the American company Paine Webber) on time — Michael’s 
fortune changed during the Great Depression. With the huge drop in 
the value of real estate and stocks, he was unable to liquidate not only 
his share holdings but also his highly mortgaged real estate holdings, 
with which he had fi nanced his expansion. Despite huge assets, many 
of his highly indebted German ventures became insolvent, which led 
by the end of 1932 to formal declarations of bankruptcy. This included 
also his house bank, the Industrie- und Privatbank, which got caught 
up in the turmoil of the banking crash in 1931. In 1932 Michael and 
his wife also declared personal bankruptcy. 
Although the career of Jakob Michael and his sprawling enterprise 
was quite exceptional, he was just one of many other “war and infl a-
tion profi teers,” who had risked much and gained much. They had all 
built fast-growing enterprises during the infl ation and thus earned 
reputations as “speculators.” They had survived the stabilization 
crisis at the end of the infl ation and continued their path of expan-
sion in close cooperation with the big banks, which funneled huge 
amounts of foreign credit, borrowed on a short-time basis, into these 
ventures. It is debatable whether these men should be subsumed 
under the rubric of “speculators”; they were certainly betting on 
an American type of prosperity, the gains of which were alluring to 
many (including Konrad Adenauer). At any rate, the post-1929 years 
demonstrated how risky these economic activities had been.31 The 
onset of the depression became a time of reckoning. The gewiegteste 
Infl ationstechniker (the most cunning technicians of infl ation) lose in 
time of defl ation — if not in 1923/24, then since 1929.32 The sudden 
eruption of talk about the “future of capitalism,” starting in 1929/30, 
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should not blind us to the fact that the problem actually boiled down 
to the question: what kind of capitalism in what kind of state? And 
the abstract formulation (already of contemporaries) should not blind 
us to the fact that what was really up for debate was the question: 
which “capitalists”?
IV. 
The swift  and dramatic rescue of the German banking system by 
the Reich in the wake of the banking crisis of 1931 has oft en been 
described. The partial if not complete takeover of the big German 
banks by the Reich was as stunning as the sums that were involved. 
The rescue was accompanied by an acrimonious row, between bank-
ing representatives and the Brüning government, over the question 
whether the banking industry could have managed the crisis on 
its own from the start. When the Danat Bank failed, it appeared to 
Brüning that its biggest competitors, the Deutsche Bank and the 
Dresdner Bank, were not unhappy to be rid of their rival, although 
the Danat Bank disaster made it necessary for the Reich to save 
the two other banks as well. This was the context in which Ernst 
Trendelenburg, an undersecretary at the Ministry of Economics, 
argued, as many others did, that the private economic system could 
only be maintained “if it is protected from the capitalists who seek 
profi ts only and want the state to shoulder the losses.”33 For Reich 
Finance Minister Hermann Dietrich, the prerequisite for a return to 
a “healthy” state of aff airs was to purge capitalism of its “speculative 
elements” and to re-introduce the “service functions” that banks 
were supposed to perform for the economy. “The struggle for and 
against high fi nance has ended with the infl uence of the Reich on 
the big banks,” maintained Dietrich in his defense of the take-over 
of parts of Friedrich Flick’s corporation by the Reich. He stressed 
that the aim was to use new personnel “to liquidate the Babylonian 
tower-building, which had become unhealthy and unsustainable 
within establishments, in a way that would least harm the Reich and 
the German economy.” According to Dietrich, the alternative, namely 
not intervening, would have meant a “gigantic crash” of the economy 
that would have cost hundreds of thousands of people their jobs.34 
It is important to keep in mind that the Reich did not just intervene 
in the business of the big banks, banks that, as we would say today, 
were of “systemic” importance to the economic system. Taking 
over the banks was tantamount to making fast decisions about 
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who should be saved and who should not. The author of the 1933 
book Konzernkrach mentioned an “eminent banker” and adviser 
to the Brüning government of whom it was said that before falling 
asleep each night his last thought was about which debtor should 
receive the order to clear his debit balance the next morning”.35 In 
his memoirs, Brüning vividly describes, with a trace of anger, the 
appeals for help by former business heroes such as Friedrich Flick 
and Otto Wolff , but also the doggedness of the representatives of 
farmers, both churches, and the center-right political parties. Despite 
striking cases of mismanagement and, as it turned out, sometimes 
outright fraud, people ceaselessly approached the Reich Chancellery 
in pursuit of bail-out loans. Among them was the Volksverein für das 
katholische Deutschland (People’s Association for Catholic Germany), 
an important organization associated with Brüning’s own Catholic 
Center Party. The association had overextended its fi nances by vastly 
expanding not only its printing plant in Mönchen-Gladbach but its 
entire media business (with the involvement a banker by the name of 
Brüning, an unrelated namesake of the chancellor, whose activities 
became an embarrassment for the politician because his name kept 
being mentioned in the context of criminal prosecutions). The oth-
erwise staunch defender of market liberalism, the Wirtschaft spartei, 
asked for help for the Berliner Handelsbank, to which the party was 
closely connected. The fi nancial troubles of the large home-loan bank 
Devaheim, a bank associated with the Protestant Church, endangered 
funds that had been donated to support the church’s missions and 
ended in a well-publicized trial, which revealed serious fraud. No 
doubt the demands that were most vexing for Brüning were those 
made by the agricultural interests close to the Conservatives and to 
his own Center Party, with their incessant call for public monies to 
bail out their indebted landed properties and their ailing agricultural 
credit institutions, some of which were in scandalous shape.36 
These public eff orts to rescue companies were problematic not only 
for economic and fi scal reasons, but also because they raised serious 
concerns with respect to the morality of political behavior. Who was 
to be bailed out with taxpayers’ money directly by the Reich or indi-
rectly, by way of the newly state-controlled banks? For that matter: 
who was to make that decision? It is striking how willing Brüning was 
to incriminate himself and his government aft er the war; for he must 
have known that his own description of the disbursement of public 
funds to certain groups and individuals left  him and the Republic 
vulnerable to accusations of political corruption. No doubt Brüning 
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wanted to hold a mirror up to those who had accused the Republic 
of corruption: His revelations were aimed not only at agrarian groups 
but even at the Reich President Hindenburg’s entourage, whom he 
connected to dubious fi nancial transactions. This included rumors 
about the head of the Commerz- und Privatbank, Curt Sobernheim, 
who had lost a fortune in the stock market crash and had allegedly 
“taken down” with him the wives of men connected to Hindenburg, 
as a result of highly speculative deals. According to Brüning, there 
was pressure on the bank to absorb the losses incurred by the 
speculation accounts of these individuals out of consideration for 
the upcoming presidential election. This was problematic — just 
as it had been in the case of Adenauer when he was bailed out by 
the Deutsche Bank — because the Commerzbank had also been 
partially been taken over by the Reich. Similarly problematic was a 
secret campaign fund for the 1932 presidential election to support 
the republican parties (but also the NSDAP), fi nanced in great part 
by Friedrich Flick. Flick, whom the historian Georg Hallgarten called 
a “daredevil speculator,” had been bailed out by the Reich when it 
bought his fi nancially troubled iron and steel conglomerate, the 
Charlottenhütte, for what everybody considered an exorbitantly high 
price.37 In the end, one might read Brüning’s account not only as a 
story about the selfi shness and political and economic opportunism 
of the times, but more importantly, as a story illustrating how the 
speculative spirit bred political corruption and eventually threatened 
to engulf even those, like Brüning, who otherwise had nothing to do 
with political corruption. 
V.
As early as 1927, the U.S. Federal Reserve talked about taking the 
wind out of the sails of “speculative excesses” that had led to a 
misallocation of fi nancial resources, heated up the stock market 
and undoubtedly caused real “excesses.” For a long time, it has been 
argued that the Federal Reserve was greatly responsible not only for 
the crash in 1929 but also the Great Depression. There has also been 
much debate on the question of whether the American happy-go-
lucky stock market boom actually had a solid foundation, as some 
American economists would argue today. Most contemporaries 
would have disagreed, and this is certainly true of most politicians. 
President Hoover’s Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon alluded to past 
excesses when he said: “I will purge the rottenness of the system.”38 
His German counterpart, Reich Finance Minister Hermann Dietrich, 
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and many in the Brüning administration would have agreed, although 
for diff erent reasons. In Germany the stock market boom had already 
burst in 1927, although there was a upsurge in 1929 that misled 
many.39 As Brüning wrote in his memoirs, in 1931 his ministers and 
the state bureaucracy were confronted with “an abyss of corruption 
and imprudence in business that not only surpassed all imagination 
but [evoked] a measure of change in the temperament and eager-
ness to work among all of the cabinet members.” With bitterness 
he recalled the “cold-bloodedness” with which he, members of his 
government, and high-ranking civil servants were frequently “lied” 
to. According to Brüning, during one of the many meetings aft er the 
bank crash of 1931 the president of the Reichsbank, Hans Luther, got 
enraged and claimed that “all the people sitting across from us here 
are crooks. They were all broke back in 1926. I said the very same 
thing to them already in 1926.”40 Here Luther was referring to the situ-
ation aft er the hyperinfl ation when the books had not been properly 
adjusted. “The healing process within the German economy is not yet 
completed,” wrote one business journalist in his book Konzernkrach 
(The Company Crash), published in early 1933. In the period follow-
ing World War I, particularly aft er the stabilization of the currency 
in 1923/24, he argued, both well-known “Infl ationsgrößen” (“great 
men of the infl ation,” an ironic circumscription of ruthless profi teers 
and speculators) — the author mentioned Jakob Michael and Hugo 
Stinnes, among others — and “old-school businessmen,” who ran 
fi rms like Nordwolle, Favag, Karstadt and the Burbach ironworks, 
“did not have the right feeling for numbers aft er the stabilization of 
the currency. The lack of a proper sense of proportion in a stable cur-
rency did not always lead to the demise of a company. But it put most 
businesses in very dangerous situations and it always ended with the 
fi nal fi nancial ruin and ultimate downfall of their power-hungry and 
short-sighted directors general.”41
The subtext of such contemporary commentaries is that something 
had been going wrong since the stabilization of the currency in 
1923/24; they also convey the notion of a “sick economy.” Since the 
important work of Knut Borchardt, we associate this notion with 
“high” wages, taxes, and social welfare costs, an “overstaff ed” bank-
ing apparatus, and the wrong uses of foreign credit, such as their 
use by German cities to build parks and swimming pools. No doubt, 
this perspective was shared by Brüning and many others, especially 
economists and businessmen. However, for the Brüning government 
the problem ran deeper and came to the fore during the recession: the 
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monetary stabilization had not put the economy on a sound footing; 
although the earlier “excesses of the infl ation” might have vanished 
from sight, they were not altogether purged. Underlying this was 
a strong feeling of disillusionment because for a while things had 
looked diff erent: in 1927/28, it looked like the courts had dealt with 
the big cases of real or alleged mismanagement, speculation, and 
political corruption during the infl ation. There had been a widespread 
feeling at that time that the past craze had caused practices that were 
characteristic of the infl ation period and that these were now being 
abandoned. It was believed that the return to economic normalcy 
would quite naturally weed out the relicts of former excesses, which 
also had such a disastrous impact on the moral order of society. The 
vexing issue was that the depression brought to the surface all sorts 
of Luft geschäft e42 that had been associated with the speculative fervor 
of the infl ation period: devastating forms of speculation by seemingly 
reasonable individuals; forms of cheating; and, not to be forgotten, 
the corruption of business ethics that had become associated with 
the Grenzgänger of capitalism. 
The politics of defl ation, pursued by both the Brüning government 
and the Hoover administration, served many purposes, both eco-
nomically and politically. But there can be no doubt that defl ation 
was, among other things, a strategy designed to rid the system of 
past speculation and its ill eff ects. Some economists studying this 
period, such as Barry Eichengreen, have stressed the “golden fetters” 
of the gold standard, which led the defenders of the gold standard 
to argue for the crushing regiment of defl ation. It is more just than a 
side note to mention the derogatory remarks of R. H. Mottram, the 
proponent of “Speculation” mentioned earlier. At the height of the 
speculation frenzy he argued that, thanks to new forms of credit, the 
gold standard was now not much more than an outmoded “curios-
ity,” which “perpetuat[ed] the peasant mentality that is never really 
sure of itself unless it can handle tangible metal.” The idea that “the 
million individual bargains upon which all Speculation, as well as 
ordinary trade, is founded, could be liquidated in gold, may seem 
to the modern mind a trifl e cumbrous.”43 Such utterances illustrate 
that the “rules” of the gold standard, namely defl ationary policies, 
made it possible to liquidate speculative ventures — and with it 
the phantasms of speculation of the likes of Mottram. In our own 
day, Timothy Geithner, the former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, 
has characterized the current German position as a “moral-hazard 
fundamentalism,” that is, the conviction that those responsible for 
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the crisis should not get away without repercussions. At least with 
respect to what happened in the early 1930s, Geithner’s words defi -
nitely capture a widespread “Old Testament sort of revenge” directed 
against banks, bankers, and businessmen that had allowed things 
to develop as they did.44
VI.
It should not come as a surprise that Germany’s economic crisis inau-
gurated an intense debate about the future of capitalism and the role 
of the state. Although the debate was polyphonic, most voices agreed 
that the state was to play a new role in the economy. In Germany, a 
jurist like Carl Schmitt set the agenda. In 1931, Schmitt diagnosed a 
“Wendung zum totalen Staat” (a turn toward the total state) that had 
been going on since the war. He was convinced that this was not a 
positive sign because what was happening was that since the war 
“society was organizing itself as the state.” In other words, social 
interests were taking over the state, a development that Schmitt saw 
refl ected in the newly prevalent ideas of a Wirtschaft sstaat, Sozialstaat 
and Kulturstaat. This development posed a threat because it made 
“all social and economic problems immediately become problems 
of the state.” For Schmitt, who liked paradoxical formulations, this 
state was “total because of [its] weakness and inability to resist, be-
cause of its inability to withstand the onslaught of political parties 
and organized interests.” Schmitt’s alternative total state would be 
diff erent; for it would not be “undermined by any catchwords like 
liberalism, constitutional state, or however one wants to call it.” The 
strong Italian fascist state off ered such options. In 1931/32, Schmitt, 
who later welcomed Hitler, still argued for other options: Reich 
President, bureaucracy and army were to function as “custodians 
of the constitution” (Hüter der Verfassung). At a time when many 
experts argued that the Reich’s fi scal policies already amounted to a 
“military dictatorship” or that the worsening of the economic crisis 
necessitated declaring a “state of siege” (Belagerungszustand), Schmitt 
argued that the emergency powers under Article 48 of the Weimar 
constitution, which included possible economic intervention, were 
to play an important part in restoring the authority of the state.45 
Restoring “order” was the slogan of the day and became one of the 
key concepts that pervaded a wide variety of public and academic 
debates. Unlike most modern economists, contemporary economists 
had still been trained in history, government, and public policy, and 
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Schmitt’s odd but sharp thinking raised many questions that had 
been asked in other academic fi elds.46 Restoring the authority of the 
state was not just a matter of theory. It pertained foremost to the 
constitutional reorganization of the institutional arrangements for 
nearly everything: the constitutional relationship between Reich and 
Länder; social, economic and fi scal policies; or the future of parlia-
mentarianism, for that matter. Equally important were the eff orts to 
prevent future economic crisis and to safeguard for fi scal solidity. The 
execution of this task was delegated to the state bureaucracies, which 
were empowered legally and, equally important, “idealistically” by 
offi  cial emergency decrees and constant public appeals to a state of 
economic and political emergency. Given the malfunctioning of the 
parliamentary system, this emergency was broadly discussed as a 
general Staatsnotstand. It implied a constant appeal to idealized forms 
of state and bureaucratic rule, which, so it was argued, had been sub-
verted by the parliament and special private interests. With respect to 
a revitalized state, this ideology shaped the mentalities of all actors, 
trickled down into bureaucratic practices, and shaped new institu-
tional set-ups. The fl ight into the executive state was tantamount to 
opening a Pandora’s box, at least in Germany. In no other country 
did revisions of the economic order become so entangled with ideas 
and initiatives for what turned out to be open-ended revisions of the 
political order. Yet in all European countries, the eff orts to fi ght the 
eff ects of the Great Depression changed the rules of the political and 
economic game. For the sake of brevity, the remainder of this article 
will focus on several regulatory solutions that were implemented at 
the time and eventually led to the new economic order of National 
Socialism in diff erent, yet curiously interconnected ways.
There is no scarcity of studies that detail the series of far-reaching 
state interventions, mostly by ad hoc emergency decrees, right aft er 
the banking crisis in the summer of 1931. These interventions cre-
ated the basis of an altogether new regulatory framework for bank-
ing, which eventually became codifi ed in the Reich Banking Act of 
5 December 1934 (and which continued to be applied in West Germany 
aft er the war). It regulated not only the government supervision of 
banks but also lending, minimum capital provisions, cash reserves, 
bank licensing, and rules about making loans to members of the 
bank (which had been one source of speculation before the war). It 
was within this new legal framework that the re-privatization of the 
banks took place in the mid-1930s in Germany. Economic histori-
ans generally characterize it as an “overdue modernization” of the 
46  See Abelshauser, 
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banking system.47 Analogous laws and regulatory frameworks can be 
found in many other countries, such as in the United States under 
President Roosevelt. These laws aimed at fencing in and reorganizing 
the banking system — which despite many regulatory eff orts was still 
fi rmly rooted in the age of economic liberalism — in order to rid it of 
the ills that had come to the fore in the previous years and to create 
a new framework. 
As studies of German banks by Harold James, Dieter Ziegler, 
Johannes Bähr, and others have demonstrated in detail, the govern-
ment also exerted great pressure on the banks with regard to personnel 
decisions. Identifying those who were to blame for past failure was 
most important, so it is not astonishing that it was a common sport 
to pass on the blame to others. By emergency decree it was possible 
to radically reduce the number of supervisory board members in com-
panies, a step that went hand in hand with strong pressure from the 
government to get rid of executive board members and other men in 
leading positions in the newly state-controlled banks and to appoint 
fi duciaries, especially to key positions.48 The directives issued by the 
Brüning government were quite specifi c: the new credo was clearly to 
“eliminate speculators in the banks.” Brüning stated that “[u]nder no 
circumstances are individuals allowed in top management who are 
in debt to their own bank by way of “speculation accounts.” He made 
the same point even more pressingly elsewhere: “The people who are 
burdened with the odium of mistakes should be eliminated as far as 
consideration for continuity of general technical operations allows.”49 
Despite the many studies on bank history, we know very little about 
the “golden age” of speculative dealing among bank employees and 
board members. From the perspective of those involved, the line 
between what was and what was not considered “speculative” with 
regard to business fi nancing was by no means obvious. The way the 
failure of Deutsche Bank was handled in the Katzenellenbogen case, 
for example, makes it clear that those responsible were usually able 
to maneuver their way out of taking responsibility.50
Still, the outside pressure exerted by the new men at the big banks 
who had the backing of the Reich, by the pending judicial inves-
tigations, and, last but not least, by public opinion should not be 
underestimated, any more than the new pressure exerted within 
organizations. Georg Solmssen, the spokesman for the managing 
board of Deutsche Bank is a good example. On the one hand, he de-
fended the autonomy of banks and criticized those who did not want 
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to acknowledge the political origins of the present economic crisis. On 
the other hand, he adopted the criticism of banks made by men like 
Brüning and Dittrich by blaming the “speculators” within the ranks 
of business: “For periods at a time, the German economy kneeled 
before people whose knowledge and talent amounted to nothing 
more than speculation with stocks.” Like many others, he also argued 
that, in order to stay autonomous from governmental interventions 
in the future, the private sector of the economy (Privatwirtschaft ) had 
to cleanse itself of “Schädlinge” (parasites or vermin). He combined 
his call for a renewed code of honor with his own endorsement of 
a “clean capitalism,” which would include the rule that members of 
banks could not mingle private and bank business.51 This said, it is 
worth noting that Reichsbank President Hans Luther, who had more 
than one confrontation with Solmssen aft er the banking crisis of 1931, 
included a joke circulating about Solmssen in his otherwise sober and 
factual autobiography: A fairy off ers to grant Solmssen one wish. And 
what does the man who was happily living a life of luxury on Berlin’s 
island of Schwanenwerder wish for? To know at least once the stock 
market quotes of the day aft er tomorrow.52
Combating Schädlinge was of paramount importance in government 
policy. This implied making decisions about which enterprises were 
to survive. Albert Hackelsberger, one of Brüning‘s economic advisors, 
argued that this meant implementing not only “reforms of a tangible 
nature,” like the above-mentioned Reich Banking Act, but also “a 
reform of attitude, of business ethics” that was particularly necessary 
“if the moral principles in our economies are to gain ground, if we 
truly want to experience a healthy economy once again.” The rhetoric 
included catchwords like the “dienende Funktion der Banken” (the 
service function of banks), and especially aft er 1933, slogans like “Ge-
meinnutz geht vor Eigennutz” (public interest before self-interest). 
At fi rst sight, such utterances might appear to be empty and mean-
ingless rhetorical formulas. But they implied important strategies of 
“othering,” of making speculation and speculative behavior some-
thing outside acceptable “normal” — bourgeois or decent business — 
behavior. Unfortunately we know next to nothing about changing 
forms of business ethic and habitus (in the sense of Pierre Bourdieu) 
in the banking community. What was decent and ethical business 
behavior is diffi  cult to decide to begin with; this is even more the case 
aft er the political regime change in 1933 when the rules of the game 
changed fundamentally. As Harold James had argued, the “internal 
dynamics of bank bureaucracy,” namely the prevailing opportunism 
51  Georg Solmssen, Die Zu-
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to conform to the new regime also for the sake of newly available 
jobs, helped “to permeate National Socialist ideology through the 
bank.”53 As Georg Solmssen wrote in a moving letter in April 1933, 
there existed a pervasive atmosphere of a “manifest lack of any feel-
ing of solidarity” on the part of those who had formerly worked “side 
by side with Jewish colleagues.” There was not only an “ever-clearer 
readiness to take personal advantage of the fact that jobs are now 
falling vacant”; but “the dead silence that greets the ignominy and 
shame irremediably infl icted on those who, albeit innocent, fi nd the 
foundations of their honor and livelihood undermined from one day 
to the next” was conspicuous.54 By 1933, speculative activity could 
easily be subsumed under the rubric of “Jewish behavior.” How these 
resentments against “Jewish speculators” came to infl uence decision 
making even before 1933 is hard to say. Recruiting patterns might be 
one clue: the men Brüning trusted for economic advice and the major-
ity of the new fi duciaries appointed by the Reich were not Jewish.55 
Even before 1933, more oft en than not the plea for rejuvenation 
called for draconian measures to punish those guilty of misdeeds. 
The above-mentioned Hackelsberger called for martial courts (Stand-
gerichte), which was quite typical of this line of state-of-emergency 
thinking and in tune with popular, and populist, pleas across party 
lines not to treat profi teers and ruthless speculators with the prover-
bial “velvet gloves” (see fi gure 2). Mocking the lengthy indictments 
and court verdicts of up to a thousand pages, he argued that martial 
courts off ered a chance to “try such cases in the fastest way possible 
in a type of pretrial and at least bring the individuals concerned 
behind bars.”56 It is not without bitter irony that Hackelsberger, 
who was to collaborate very closely with the Nazis, ended up dying 
in pretrial detention on charges of allegedly violating the foreign-
currency regulations.
VII.
Nowhere is this peculiar mixture of resentment against speculation, 
anti-Semitism, state-of-emergency exigencies, prevailing techno-
cratic ideas for solving “acute problems,” and the logic of punish-
ment more apparent than in the new regime of capital controls 
designed to control transnational capital movements. Given the lack 
of trust in the German Mark, the fl ight of not only foreign, especially 
American, capital but also of German capital to nearby safe havens 
like the Netherlands and Switzerland was a real issue.57 Ever since 
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Figure 2. “There can be 
no argument: Germany 
really is the freest country 
in the world. In England we 
would have been locked 
up in prison a long time 
ago.” Simplicissimus 36 
(1931), no. 34 (23 Novem-
ber 1931), p. 405. Reprinted 
with permission.
the infl ation period, there 
was an innuendo that 
currency speculation 
betting on the decline of 
the Mark implied trea-
son, and there had been 
legions of more or less 
unsuccessful efforts to 
introduce capital con-
trols. The fi nancial and 
economic purposes were 
obvious. Politically, the 
control of capital move-
ments was one of many 
eff orts to strengthen the 
principle of territorial-
ity and the sovereignty 
of the state, which in 
the past had proven to 
be weak vis-à-vis “self-
ish” economic interest. 
Such eff orts also thrived 
on anti-Semitism, on the 
assumption that much of 
this money was “Jewish 
money”.58
One of the more drastic, although originally quite peripheral mea-
sures in this new eff ort to control the fl ight of capital was the so-
called Reichsfl uchtsteuer (tax on those who fl ee the country), which 
was introduced along with a large number of other fi scal, economic, 
and political measures by emergency decree on 8 December 1931.59 
German citizens who gave up their domestic residency and settled 
abroad were charged a one-time tax amounting to 25 percent of their 
taxable assets and income. Not only was the rate of this tax exorbi-
tant, the sanctions were drastic. Wanted posters (Steuersteckbriefe) 
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were issued for delinquent taxpayers and posted publicly alongside 
those of common criminals. Moreover, they were required to pay an 
additional fi ve-percent penalty fee for each commenced half-month 
that they had failed to pay the original tax. Mathematically, this 
meant that a person’s entire property could be confi scated within a 
short period. The offi  cial justifi cation of this particular section of the 
emergency decree read that “wealthy Germans who resettle abroad 
not in order to leave the country permanently but to avoid the high tax 
burden” had committed “treason against the German people.” The 
aim of this provision of the emergency degree was to have the “tax 
refugees” resettle in Germany. No doubt, this decree was motivated 
not only by fi scal reasons. Aft er all, cracking down on tax-evaders, es-
pecially those who “fl ed” the country, was popular among all political 
parties, left  and right. And the underlying sentiments of retribution 
are more than apparent, as can be seen in some very odd paragraphs 
of the fi rst draft s of the Reichsfl uchtsteuer decree, which were deleted 
from the fi nal version: upon returning to Germany, persons were to 
be imprisoned; one had even thought about a clause that would have 
allowed every citizen to detain individuals under suspicion.60 
The history of the Reichsfl uchtsteuer brings me back to Jakob und 
Erna Michael, who were among the fi rst to be targeted. In 1931, 
Jakob Michael settled in the Netherlands, to be followed the next 
year by his wife. In the summer of 1932, Berlin tax authorities issued 
the Michaels their fi rst tax bill, as stipulated by this new legisla-
tion, of more than 8 million RM which by itself was ruinous to the 
credit-worthiness of Michael’s enterprises. In January and July 1933, 
assets valued in the millions were confi scated in advance of criminal 
proceedings. The confi scations in early January alone were enough 
to plunge the company into dire fi nancial straits because the debt, 
consisting of tax obligations and preliminary fi nes, was growing 
constantly. At the beginning of 1935, tax authorities calculated that 
the Michaels currently owed 14 million RM, of which 12 million RM 
were for the Reichsfl uchtsteuer (which at that point was still not legally 
binding because Michael was contesting it). When we consider that in 
1931/32 and 1932/33 totals of 1.9 million and 1 million RM, respec-
tively, were collected through the Reichsfl uchtsteuer, it becomes clear 
that the Michaels were not the proverbial “little fi sh” to be caught 
in the tax net, but the really big ones.61 In fact, it seems quite likely 
that the business enterprises of the Michaels actually prompted the 
introduction of the Reichsfl uchtsteuer to begin with. But there is no 
tangible proof of this, although Finance Minister Hermann Dietrich, 
60  IfZ ED 93/16 Tagebücher 
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who had notorious resentments against Jews, argued in November 
1931 that “Der Handelsjude, der uns so hohe Zinsen abgenommen 
hat, kann jetzt auch einmal ordentlich etwas hergeben.” (The Jew-
ish trader who charged us such high interest should now fork over 
a substantial sum.)62 Michael’s name did surface in the context of 
important revisions to this tax law in 1934, aft er the highest German 
tax court had in fact decided in Michael’s favour because he still 
maintained a residence in Germany. The revisions of the law that were 
made in response to the court’s verdict were very important insofar 
as they granted tax authorities an arbitrary right to access the assets 
of all those citizens who dared not return to Germany aft er the Nazi 
seizure of power on 30 January 1933 and who would — sooner or 
later — be driven from Germany or would fl ee to avoid persecution. 63 
The German tax and customs authorities suspected that the Michaels 
systematically transferred capital and fi rm stock out of Germany; 
and Brüning’s reference in his memoirs to a supposed “Mantelkor-
poration,” that is, a holding company, in Connecticut shows that 
Michael’s was a notorious and widely discussed case at the time. The 
authorities also suspected that he had broken foreign currency and 
capital control regulations, justifying other penalties of several million 
Reichsmark. No doubt, these radical eff orts must also be seen in the 
context of past frustrations. The extreme complexity of Michael’s 
corporate organization was a vexing issue for tax offi  cials (although 
we do not know if it was any more vexing than, for instance, the set-
up of the mega-rich Thyssen family); in 1925/26 the fi nancier had 
been on the radar of state prosecutors, whose clutches he escaped 
by leaving the country for a while.“Speculation” was not an explicit 
argument for prosecution, but this charge lurked in the background. 
A good illustration for this is a letter from March 1932 written by 
the president of the Landesfi nanzamt Kassel. He pleaded strongly 
in favor of the criminal prosecution of the Michael Corporation. It 
was generally known, he argued, that the corporation had exhibited 
“behavior damaging to the German economy”; some of the business 
consisted of “purely theatrical accounting maneuvers” and the “focus 
of business operations does not lie in commodity transactions but in 
speculation. The head of the fi rm pursues only one aim, to transfer 
every bit of profi t possible abroad.” The company management, he 
argued, acted “according to principles that fortunately are foreign 
to German business life in this manner . . . I consider it absolutely 
necessary to carry out the proceedings. Such elements have to be 
excluded from German business. To tolerate them in order to cover 
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the misjudgments of the credit banks and other creditors [who ran the 
risk of losing their money if Michael’s property was confi scated for 
the Reich — MHG] may be very dangerous.”64 
Aft er 1933, any scruples about making such remarks had disappeared, 
especially among National Socialists. In connection with the debates 
that started in 1933/34 about the expatriation of the Michaels, the 
mayor of Berlin intervened and emphasized that, in reference to the 
non-collectible tax debt, there existed “great interest in the expe-
dited implementation of the initiated expatriation proceedings and 
especially in the confi scation of all domestic property.” The “thor-
oughly labyrinthine and unproductive Michael Corporation,” with 
its multitude of companies, had to be “made to disappear from the 
tax lists.” The city referred to reports from the Netherlands, where 
Michael was said to surround himself “exclusively with Jews” who 
had fl ed or emigrated from Germany and whom he also supported. 65 
The way in which the language of exclusion became radicalized and 
was adapted to new conventions is clearly illustrated by the case of 
a young public prosecutor in Berlin. In 1933, this prosecutor had 
investigated charges of “currency profi teering” (Devisenschiebungen) 
and initially came to the conclusion that the charges levelled by the 
Frankfurt customs authorities in connection with the tax bill of over 
4 million Marks could not be upheld. Only later did he apparently 
realize that his assessment of the case was not at all opportune. He 
not only back-tracked, attempted to erase his earlier derogatory mar-
ginalia on the statement submitted by the customs authorities, and 
charged the corporation with violating the foreign currency law; in 
an article in the journal Juristische Wochenschrift  he tried to demon-
strate that his personal convictions were on the right side: “Since the 
beginning of the currency controls, but primarily since the National 
Socialist revolution, it can be seen increasingly that Jews living or 
having emigrated abroad and other economic parasites — that is, 
primarily those circles who nearly trip over themselves in the most 
boundless denigration of the German people and its new national 
leadership — band together for commercial currency graft . Entire 
bands of such profi t-seekers without homeland and conscience ap-
pear on the scene in Germany and help each other in the prohibited 
currency and Sperrmark business with the aim not only of carrying 
off  the wealth of our people and endangering the German currency, 
but also of raking in the sometimes very high profi t linked to it at 
our expense.”66 
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In practice, the case of Michael’s expropriation and expatriation (dep-
rivation of citizenship) dragged out until the end of the 1930s. It was 
utterly Kafk aesque, fi rst because of endless infi ghting between German 
tax and custom agencies, and hence between the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Economics, over whose claims were to take priority 
and which regulations applied at which time. In addition, there were 
independent eff orts, especially by the NSDAP, to deprive the Michaels 
of German citizenship on the basis of new legislation, which, inci-
dentally, was also the easiest way to confi scate their property.67 Stuck 
somewhere in between were Michael’s private German creditors, who 
feared that they would go empty-handed if the Reich fi scal authorities 
got their way. The case of the Michaels was also Kafk aesque — and 
probably singular — for the simple reason that Michael outsmarted 
the German bureaucrats. Aft er 1933 he sold the Köster AG, which 
ran highly successful department stores, and whose stock he had 
transferred to the Netherlands and later from there onto an account 
in England and thus placed out of the reach of German claims, to a 
sham owner from New York. This owner not only operated and even 
expanded this successful business in an alliance of convenience with 
leading Nazi and SS functionaries. He even repurchased company 
property, including the real estate of the Michaelschen Hackeschen Hof 
Gmbh, which had previously been sold off  at a foreclosure auction. As if 
all of this was not strange enough, in 1940 the Auswärtige Amt, which 
handled revocation of German citizenship, had to rescind Michael’s 
expatriation of 1938 because of new information it had received, from 
unclear sources. It became known that, already in 1931, the Michaels 
had acquired Lichtenstein citizenship. 
Clearly, the “speculator” Michael, who had been a continuous object 
of attack and slander, had apparently already bet in 1931 on Germany’s 
declining future and his own and his family’s survival outside of Ger-
many. With respect to the Köster AG, he also might have speculated in 
the 1930s on a German future without the Nazis. In the 1950s he sold 
his department stores to Horten, who ran department-stores and with 
whom he had cooperated earlier. However, his valuable properties in 
the Soviet Zone, especially in Berlin-Mitte, were confi scated as assets 
belonging to “war criminals and Nazi activists,” which made this an 
important and complicated case of restitution in the 1990s.68
VIII. 
The case of the Michaels demonstrates that the popular call to rid 
Germany of speculation must be seen with some ambivalence, all 
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the more so if one wants to frame this history in terms of success 
or failure. The emergency legislation of the late Weimar Republic 
brought about a new institutional framework that helped to con-
tain certain excesses that were blamed for the crisis. At the same 
time, this initiative went astray, as the case of Reichsfl uchtsteuer 
illustrates. The prevalent mentality, a form of state-of-emergency 
thinking with Schmittian subtones, no doubt facilitated this.69 Aft er 
the Nazi seizure of power this thinking rapidly became radicalized 
and associated Jews with speculation, which was a convenient way 
of “othering” speculation and speculators. Like many Germans, 
the majority of the Nazis did not like banks, and they liked Jewish 
bankers — known in their jargon as Jewish Börsenfürsten (stock market 
princes) — even less.70 At the time, almost everybody considered the 
rhetoric of expropriating and expatriating these Börsenfürsten lunatic 
and absurd; but by the late 1930s the Nazi agenda had, by and large, 
translated it into reality. 
Equally interesting and a matter for future research is another ques-
tion, namely what implications all of this had for ideas about and ac-
tual practices of speculation among those Germans who were deemed 
worthy of being Volksgenossen. First of all, one should keep in mind 
that the “cleansing campaign” of the spring of 1933 was also directed 
against many people who had been charged with speculation, cor-
ruption, and illicit behavior. Despite a few show trials (such as the 
ones of the Volksverein and the leadership of the Center party) and 
a good number of individual convictions, not much came out of this 
except that it left  a considerable number of people frightened for their 
lives and property. There is evidence that the new Reich Economics 
Minister, Hermann Göring, held his protective hands over some of 
these “black sheep” — only to extort money for whitewashing them.71 
Unfortunately, we know little about the long-term implications of 
these developments for general attitudes toward speculation, spe-
cifi cally how they might have aff ected individual participation in the 
stock market or how they helped to shape a new alliance between 
banks and industry, based on a new consensus on a “producing” and 
“productive” economy. Aft er 1945, there were strong voices within 
the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank that distanced themselves 
from the “system of [Jakob] Goldschmidt.” The “Hasadeur,” that is 
the “player”, and the “Bankrotteur,” who “should never have been 
allowed to become Großbankdirektor,” had become the scapegoat 
responsible for everything that had gone wrong.72 
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Did the aversion to speculation lay the foundation for the “tamed 
capitalism” of the postwar period? In the United States, Wall Street 
and brokerage fi rms had become “dull places” to work by the 1930s.73 
Anyone interested in the issue of speculation in the postwar period 
looked back at the late 1920s; the speculation and the big players of 
the time appeared to be nothing but curious phenomena of a long-
gone era. The lessons of speculation seemed to have been learned. 
However, as John Kenneth Galbraith has reminded us, “fi nancial 
memory” lasts no longer than twenty years.74
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